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Though ﬁrst published almost one century ago, and though its premise has been disputed,
Clive Bell’s essay on aesthetics in his book Art still provides fertile ground for discussing
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view.
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INTRODUCTION
In his book Art (Bell, 1914), Clive Bell (1881–1964), the English
art critic, “tried to develop a complete theory of visual art. . .in
the light of which the history of art from paleolithic days to the
present becomes intelligible,” a theory which would give “a def-
inite meaning” to terms such as “good drawing,” “magniﬁcent
design,” “unfelt,” “ill-organized.” The basis of Bell’s theory is that,
“. . .there is a particular kind of emotion provoked by works of
visual art. . .the aesthetic emotion”; this same emotion is provoked
“by every kind of visual art” and works as diverse as “St Sophia and
the windows at Chartres, Mexican sculpture, a Persian bowl, Chi-
nese carpets, Giotto’s frescoes at Padua, and the masterpieces of
Poussin, Piero della Francesca, and Cézanne” because “either all
works of visual art have some common quality, or when we speak
of ‘works of art’we gibber.”Although his list includes architecture,
paintings, frescoes, and objets d’art, it excludes musical or other
works. He nevertheless does not consider his “aesthetic emotion”
to be aroused solely by visual art. Though claiming not to be musi-
cal, he writes of music that, “. . .at moments I do appreciate music
as pure musical form, as sounds combined according to the laws
of a mysterious necessity, as pure art with a tremendous signiﬁ-
cance of its own” (my emphasis). For him, there is as well a strong
relation between mathematical and artistic beauty, for the math-
ematician feels an emotion for his speculations which “springs. . .
from the heart of an abstract science. I wonder, sometimes, whether
the appreciators of art and of mathematical solutions are not even
more closely allied” (my emphasis and ellipsis). This statement is
not very different from that of Bertrand Russell (1917) in his book
Mysticism and Logic, that “Mathematics, rightly viewed, possesses
not only truth, but supreme beauty. . .. The true spirit of delight,
the exaltation, the sense of being more than Man, which is the
touchstone of the highest excellence, is to be found in mathematics
as surely as poetry” (my ellipsis). Hence when Bell writes that,
“. . .if we can discover some quality common and peculiar to all the
objects that provoke [the aesthetic emotion], we shall have solved
what I take to be the central problem of aesthetics” he is, I take it,
not referring to visual art alone but to everything that is capable
of arousing the “aesthetic emotion”, even if in his book he writes
almost exclusively about visual art. His use of the term “mysteri-
ous necessity” is interesting, for it raises the question“necessity for
what?” Implicit in my interpretation below is that the “necessity”
is one for preferential or privileged activation of specialized areas
of the brain.
The “common quality” that Bell refers to is, to a large extent,
“a purely subjective business” because “any system of aesthetics
which pretends to be based on some objective truth is so palpably
ridiculous as not to be worth discussing” and because “All sys-
tems of aesthetics must be based on personal experience – that
is to say, they must be subjective.” If it is subjective, as he says,
but also independent of culture and learning, then it is probably
worth asking whether it lies in some common neural organiza-
tion that leads to personal (subjective) experiences, in the form of
an “aesthetic emotion,” common to all humans. Thus one chal-
lenge raised by Bell’s formulation is to enquire whether there is
any common quality in terms of brain activity that underlies the
“aesthetic emotion” that he speaks of. But his reference to some
quality “common and peculiar to all objects,” together with his list
and description, nevertheless shows that he was also looking for
some quality or characteristic in objects themselves, even though
he professes to make of the “aesthetic emotion” a purely subjective
business. Thus another neurobiological challenge in Bell’s for-
mulations lies in trying to account for the extent to which the
experience of beauty in such diverse sources asmathematics, visual
art and music can be accounted for by objective qualities which
are preferred by all humans because these diverse sources acti-
vate similar neural conﬁgurations common to the organization
of our nervous systems and hence independent of culture and
education.
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Althoughnot concernedwith neurobiology, Bell’s formulations
thus raise interesting points about the neural systems that underlie
the experience of beauty and, in this somewhat speculative essay, I
try to frame the neurobiological insights that his formulations give
for an experimental approach to the study of beauty. Critical to
Bell’s formulations is his concept of “Signiﬁcant Form,”bywhich he
means certain combinations of lines and colors which arouse the
“aesthetic emotion.” This is a useful nucleus from which to build
a more comprehensive view, of signiﬁcant conﬁgurations that go
beyond form and color and include many other visual attributes
which can arouse the aesthetic emotion.
THE COMMON FACTOR IN THE EXPERIENCE OF BEAUTY
The ﬁrst neurobiological challenge in Bell’s theory, then, is to seek
the common (subjective) factor in all that is experienced as beau-
tiful, by transforming his question about what common property
all works that arouse the “aesthetic emotion” have, into: is there
a common mechanism in the brain that underlies the experience
of beauty, regardless of source and regardless also of culture and
experience?
Experiments which aim to determine the activity in the brain
that correlates with the experience of beauty have repeatedly
shown that there is one area, located interestingly in a part of
the emotional brain known as the medial orbito-frontal cortex
(mOFC) of the frontal lobes (Figure 1; see Ishizu and Zeki, 2011
for a review). This area is consistently active when subjects, irre-
spective of race or culture, report having had an experience of the
beautiful, regardless of whether the source is visual, musical, or
mathematical (Ishizu and Zeki, 2011; Zeki et al., unpublished); or
whether, when visual, its source is in portrait, landscape or abstract
painting and, when musical, its source is in symphonic works or
jazz.
This implies that there is some degree of abstraction for beauty
in the brain. This is not to say that this area alone is active during
such experiences, or that there is “a beauty spot” in the brain;
nor does it imply that the aesthetic emotion is aroused because of
activity in this area alone. Instead, where the experience is of visual
beauty, the input to the mOFC is through the visual brain; where
it is of musical beauty, the input is through the auditory brain.
Hence these areas, together with other regions of the brain such
as the sub-cortical caudate nucleus for visual stimuli, are co-active
with the mOFC. But it is signiﬁcant that the mOFC is the only
common area in which activity correlates with the experience of
beauty derived from different sources. At present, it seems to be
the only common (neural) property to all that is experienced as
beautiful.
EXPERIENCE OF THE PLEASANT, OF REWARD AND OF THE
BEAUTIFUL
Reward and pleasure have commonly been written about in the
philosophy of aesthetics, in relation to the experience of beauty
(Graham, 2000). It is therefore interesting to note that the mOFC
has also been found to be consistently active in the experience of
reward and pleasure. This raises a very interesting problem, so
far un-addressed: what, if any, is the difference in brain activity
that correlates with the experience of different kinds of hedonic
experience – the experience of beauty on the one hand and the
experience of something as being pleasant or rewarding on the
other. The mOFC is a large expanse of cortex with several cytoar-
chitectonic sub-divisions (see Kringelbach, 2005 for a review) and
the available evidence suggests that not all kinds of reward and
pleasure activate ﬁeld A1 of mOFC. While it seems very likely
that preference for drinks (McClure et al., 2004) correlates with
activity in the same part of mOFC (ﬁeld A1) as does the expe-
rience of abstract (O’Doherty et al., 2001) and predictive reward
(Gottfried et al., 2003) or preference for certain kinetic patterns
(Zeki and Stutters, 2013), it would appear that the hedonic expe-
rience of food correlates with a more lateral part of orbito-frontal
cortex than A1 of mOFC (Kringelbach et al., 2003) while the expe-
rience of erotic pleasure appears to correlate with a region dorsal to
ﬁeld A1 (Sescousse et al., 2010). These are approximations. Unless
the experience of reward and beauty are explored in the same sub-
jects and experiments and a conjunction analysis used, it is difﬁcult
to determine with precision whether the identical parts of mOFC
are involved in these different experiences. Aswell, if identical parts
are involved, it is difﬁcult to determine from imaging experiments
whether the same groups of cells are recruited during these differ-
ent experiences, which nevertheless share certain features – being
rewarding, pleasant or beautiful – in common. Meta-analyses such
as the ones provided by Peters and Büchel (2010) or Kühn and
Gallinat (2012), though very useful, are not much help in this
context; such meta-analyses help locate the general brain regions
FIGURE 1 | Cortical activation correlating with the experience of
beauty. Brain activity obtained through (A) the contrast Visually
Beautiful > Visually Ugly, (B) the contrast Musically Beautiful > Musically
Ugly. Panel (C) shows the results of a conjunction analysis to reveal the
areas of overlap in the activity produced in the medial orbito-frontal cortex
(mOFC; circled in A and B) when subjects experienced visual beauty (red)
and musical beauty (green). The zone of overlap is shown in yellow. From
Ishizu and Zeki (2011).
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active with speciﬁc experiences but are not presently capable of
pinpointing whether the identical regions are active.
AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE AND JUDGMENT
mOFC is as well active during aesthetic judgments (Ishizu and
Zeki, 2013), which is implied in the experience of beauty. Whether
there are separate sub-divisions within mOFC that mediate, for
example, the judgment of beauty as opposed to its experience,
remains to be seen; indeed whether the judgment of beauty comes
before its experience or whether the two occur simultaneously,
both spatially and temporally, remains an issue to be addressed.
Equally, whether one can distinguish neurobiologically between
the pleasure derived, for example, from listening to a light operetta
and the more demanding but ultimately more rewarding sym-
phonic works of Beethoven is not currently known and nor has
the question been addressed experimentally. For the moment, it
is sufﬁcient for my argument here to highlight the fact that the
mOFC is always active when humans experience beauty. Such a
deﬁnition does not, of course, deﬁne beauty and nor is it the
aim of neuroesthetics to do so, its more limited aim being to
understand the neural mechanisms that allow us to experience
beauty.
QUANTIFYING THE SUBJECTIVE EXPERIENCE OF BEAUTY
The strength of activity in the mOFC is proportional to the
declared intensity of the experience, the more intense the declared
experience, the more intense the activity (Figure 2). The graphs
of Figure 2 are derived from the observed intensity of activity
in the mOFC against the declared intensity of the experience of
beauty, averaged across subjects, without reference to the actual
paintings or musical excerpts that gave rise to the experience. Sim-
ilar parametric relationships have been observed between strength
of activity in mOFC and experience of reward and pleasure in
the articles cited above. This is interesting for two reasons. In the
ﬁrst place it gives a neurobiological answer to a question which,
though not raised by Bell, has nevertheless been regarded as cen-
tral in the philosophy of aesthetics, namely whether there can be
objective judgments of aesthetic value (Graham, 2000). The nov-
elty here is that the objective judgment relates directly to strength
of activity in a precise locus in the brain. It may thus be called
subjective, to the extent that it is activity in individual brains relat-
ing to private (if declared) experiences, although what one person
experiences as beautiful is not necessarily the same aswhat another
person experiences. But it is also objective to the extent (a) that
whenever a subject experiences beauty, regardless of source and
of culture and education, the mOFC is active and (b) that the
activity there is detectable and quantiﬁable. How this strength of
activity is related to strength of activity in what we may loosely
call the “sensory” areas of the brain remains to be determined (see
below).
It is trite to state that art and beauty are not the same, nor is it
the function of art to be solely concerned with beauty, a separation
forcefully emphasized by Marcel Duchamp when he sent a urinal
to an art exhibition. Hence these experiments are concerned with
the experience of beauty alone, not with art. Many of the pictures
viewed and the musical excerpts listened to by subjects would
FIGURE 2 | Modulation of cortical activity by aesthetic rating. Averaged parameter estimates showing modulation by beauty rating (beautiful, indifferent,
and ugly) in mOFC for (A) visual stimuli and (B) musical stimuli. A linear relationship with beauty rating was observed in both conditions. From Ishizu and Zeki
(2011).
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be considered great works of art by experts, but they were not
necessarily experienced as beautiful by subjects. This raises another
interesting point, which future experiments need to address. Bell
saw beauty as a confusing term, which he wanted to avoid. He
wrote, “But most of us, however strict we may be, are apt to apply
the epithet “beautiful” to objects that do not provoke that peculiar
emotion produced by works of art. Everyone, I suspect, has called
a butterﬂy or a ﬂower beautiful. Does anyone feel the same kind
of emotion for a butterﬂy or a ﬂower that he feels for a cathedral
or a picture; surely, it is not what I call an aesthetic emotion that
most of us feel, generally, for natural beauty. . .some people may,
occasionally, see in nature what we see in art, and feel for her an
aesthetic emotion; but. . . as a rule,most people feel a very different
kind of emotion for birds and ﬂowers and the wings of butterﬂies
from that which they feel for pictures, pots, temples, and statues”
(my ellipsis).
DETACHMENT OF THE AESTHETIC EMOTION FROM CULTURE
AND COGNITION
Bell’s aesthetic formulation depends upon objects with the power
of arousing the “aesthetic emotion” having a Signiﬁcant Form,
which he deﬁnes as a particular arrangement of lines and col-
ors, without specifying it further, for “it need be agreed only that
forms arranged and combined according to certain unknown and
mysterious laws do move us in a particular way, and that it is the
business of an artist so to combine and arrange them that they shall
move us” (my emphasis). He was not alone in thus emphasizing
line and color. Piet Mondrian also emphasized that he wanted to
create beauty through line and color (alone). In a letter, hewrote,“I
construct line and color combinations, in order to express general
beauty with the utmost awareness. . .. I believe it is possible that,
through horizontal and vertical lines constructed with awareness,
but not with calculation, led by high intuition, and brought to
harmony and rhythm, these basic forms of beauty. . .can become
a work of art” (Mondrian, letter to H. P. Bremmer, 1914). One
of the neurobiologically powerful arguments in Bell’s thesis is
that those unknown and mysterious laws have to be something
fairly basic and unrelated to learning, memory, and cultural back-
ground, an interesting counterpoint to the many who insist that
the experience of beauty is mandatorily tied to culture and edu-
cation. He writes, “Imperfect lovers [of art] bring to art and take
away the ideas and emotions of their own age and civilization. In
twelfth century Europe a man might have been greatly moved by
a Romanesque church and found nothing in a T’ang picture. To
a man of a later age, Greek sculpture meant much and Mexican
nothing, for only to the former could he bring a crowd of associ-
ated ideas to be the objects of familiar emotions. But the perfect
lover [of art], he who can feel the profound signiﬁcance of form,
is raised above the accidents of time and place. To him the prob-
lems of archeology, history, and hagiography are impertinent. If
the forms of a work are signiﬁcant its provenance is irrelevant.
Before the grandeur of those Sumerian ﬁgures in the Louvre he is
carried on the same ﬂood of emotion to the same aesthetic ecstasy
as, more than 4000 years ago, the Chaldean lover was carried. It
is the mark of great art that its appeal is universal and eternal.”
Again, without saying so explicitly, he is implying that its appeal
is “universal and eternal” because something in the (mental and
neural) biological constitution of all humans makes us receptive
to it.
Implicit in the above quote and in the list that Bell gives is
the assumption of what Immanuel Kant (Kant, 1790/1987) called
the sensus communis which unites artist and viewer irrespective
of culture and experience, since the objects Bell enumerates come
from different times and cultures and evoke a general emotion
that is common “to all ages, and peculiar to none.” Both in Art
and in his later book Since Cézanne (Bell, 1922), he is at pains to
emphasize that he is not linking it to intellect and learning, but
to something more basic, something “primitive” that is common
to all humankind. To him, intellect is the enemy of the aesthetic
emotion and “the last to feel aesthetic emotion is the historian of
art” since “The habit. . .of seeing intellectually instead of seeing
emotionally, accounts for the amazing blindness, or rather visual
shallowness, of most civilized adults.”When we view works of art,
“it is with their aesthetic and not with their cognitive value” that
we should be concerned, thus dissociating the aesthetic from the
cognitive, including cultural, element. An artisan can, he believes,
learn something from masterpieces “provided there is no culti-
vated person at hand to tell him what to feel, or to prevent him
feeling anything by telling him to think” (my italics). He writes,
“Only artists and educated people of extraordinary sensibility and
some savages and children feel the signiﬁcance of form so acutely
that they know not how things look. These see, because they see
emotionally.”To appreciate“a work of art we need to bring with us
nothing from life, no knowledge of its ideas and affairs, no famil-
iarity with its emotions.” Nor is the artist, the creator, exempt
from this, to the extent that any theoretical, scientiﬁc or literary
associations are, according to Bell, the surest route to compromise
artistic creativity and imperil the “aesthetic emotion” that their
creations might otherwise arouse. This is something, he believes,
that primitives understood since they “neither create illusions, nor
make display of extravagant accomplishments, but concentrate
their energies on the one thing needful – the creation of form.
They thus have created the ﬁnest works of art that we possess”;
“Il nous faut les barbares” [we need the barbarians] he therefore
quotes André Gide approvingly as saying (Bell, 1922). A charac-
teristic of “primitive” art is that it does not preoccupy itself with
“exact representation and ostentatious cunning”since even though
the “representative element in a work of art may or may not be
harmful, always it is irrelevant.” And all those who practice art
with some kind of intellectual overtone or undertone are doomed:
Per Krogh“started work under three crippling disabilities – a liter-
ary imagination, natural facility, and inherited science”; Van Gogh
was a preacher and therefore “too often his delicious and sensitive
works of art are smeared over, to their detriment, with tendentious
propaganda”; Vlaminck “had the misfortune to learn a recipe for
making attractive and sparkling pictures; he is now, I understand,
in retirement trying to unlearn it,” and so the list goes on. What
matters, therefore, is the skeleton, not the embellishments, “that
which is left when we have stripped a thing of all its associations,
of all its signiﬁcance as a means.”
This emphasis on something detached from intellect and cog-
nition, something more primitive and universal, can be found in
others since Bell. In literary art, Marcel Proust (1971) began his
posthumously published book, Contre Sainte-Beuve, by stating,
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“Chaque jour, j’attache moins de prix à l’intelligence. Chaque jour je
me rends mieux compte que ce n’est qu’en dehors d’elle que l’écrivain
peut ressaisir quelque chose de nos impressions passées, c’est-à-dire
atteindre quelque chose de lui même et la seul matière de l’art”1, giv-
ing to involuntary memories a primary place and to the intellect
a secondary one in artistic creativity, a view he developed in his
masterpiece. This insistence on the primacy of instinct “. . .touche
à de très importants problèmes intellectuels, peut-être au plus grand
de tous pour un artiste, à cette infériorité de l’intelligence. . .Et cette
infériorité de l’intelligence, c’est tout de même à l’intelligence qu’il
faut demander de l’établir. Car si l’intelligence ne mérite pas la
couronne suprême, c’est elle seule qui est capable de la decérner.
Et si elle n’a dans l’hiérarchie des vertus que la seconde place, il n’y
a qu’elle qui soit capable de proclamer que l’instinct doit occupier la
première”2 . Proust was thus emphasizing the primacy of instinct
and intuition in the creation of a work of art but the primacy of
intellect in discussing it.
Francis Bacon always emphasized in his work that he wanted
to “assault the nervous system”with the “rawness of the image,” to
deliver a “visual shock” and that his work was devoid of narrative,
insisting that he had “no story to tell” (Zeki and Ishizu, 2013). He
wanted to produce an immediate emotional impact on the ner-
vous, “before things got spelled out in the brain” (Peppiatt, 1996).
Hence he, too, was giving the intellect and cognition a secondary
place in artistic appreciation. More recently, Freedberg and Gallese
(2007) have challenged the primacy of cognition in responses to
art and have related such responses to phylogenetically acquired
embodied simulations, that is to a correspondence between the
viewed work and the (universal) brain templates that they acti-
vate, emphasizing in particular the actions represented and their
brain templates within the context of mirror neuron systems. This
is a perfect recipe for neuroesthetic investigation, which also is
concerned more with neural essentials, while not denying that
culture is an important component in the experience of beauty. It
is whenhewrites of Cézanne that Bell (1922) comes close to admit-
ting, perhaps without realizing it, that these mysterious laws refer
to something in our own mental or neural constitution: “Cézanne
was direct because he set himself a task which admitted of no adsc-
ititious ﬂourishes – the creation of form which should be entirely
self-supporting and intrinsically signiﬁcant. . .To achieve it he was
prepared to play the oddest tricks with natural forms – to dis-
tort” for “What is important in his art is, of course, the beauty of
his conceptions. . . indifference to verisimilitude is but the outward
and visible sign of this inward and spiritual grace” (my ellipsis
and emphases). He is therefore referring unwittingly to concepts
of form in the brain, to which external forms became subservient
in Cézanne’s work. Reality can therefore be distorted through the
conceptions of an artist but these distortions are only distortions
1Every day, I attach less importance to intelligence. Every day, I become more aware
that it is only outside it that a writer can regain something of our past impressions,
that is to say attain something of himself, which is the only material for art”
2“. . .touches on very important intellectual problems, indeed perhaps the most
important of all for an artist, namely the inferiority of the intellect. . .and this
inferiority, it is after all to the intellect that one appeals to establish it. Because if the
intellect does not merit the supreme crown, it alone is capable of discerning it. And
if in the hierarchy of instincts it occupies the second rank, it is only intellect that is
capable of proclaiming that instinct occupies the ﬁrst rank”
of the external reality; they maintain the signiﬁcant form because
signiﬁcant form is a part of our mental, and therefore neurobio-
logical, constitution. This, in a sense, unknowingly anticipates a
quest of neuroesthetics, which is to learn about those “mysterious
laws” which are at the base of the experience of beauty regard-
less of culture and upbringing and are, therefore, to a large extent
biologically determined.
It is therefore interesting to emphasize that, in our experiments
referred to above, the objective identiﬁcation of the brain locus,
whose intensity of activity correlates with the declared intensity
of the experience of beauty, is indifferent to culture, upbringing,
education, national or ethnic values. The subjects participating
in these experiments came from a variety of ethnic and cultural
backgrounds. Not all paintings or musical excerpts were uni-
formly experienced as beautiful by all subjects but, whenever a
subject experienced beauty, there was, as a correlate, activity in
the mOFC. Without denying the importance of culture and edu-
cation in shaping the experience of beauty, the importance of
this neurobiological deﬁnition transcends cultures and is univer-
sal. It is, in Bell’s terms, a capacity to experience beauty that
applies “to all ages, and [is] peculiar to none.” Hence we may
speak of Immanuel Kant’s sensus communis in a somewhat dif-
ferent sense than intended by him – as a common ability to
experience beauty which can be objectively ascertained as a com-
mon correlate of activity in a speciﬁc area of the brain in all
humans.
“SIGNIFICANT FORM” AND THE AESTHETIC EMOTION
The extent to which Bell was a formalist, looking for qualities
in the objects themselves, even in spite of his subjective approach,
becomes clear when he writes of his list, given above, that,“In each,
lines and colours combined in a particular way, certain forms and
relations of forms, stir our aesthetic emotions. These relations
and combinations of lines and colours, these aesthetically moving
forms, I call ‘Signiﬁcant Form’, which is ‘the one quality common
to all works of art’.” He does not specify what “Signiﬁcant Form”
means in terms of mathematics or music but his statement, that at
times he can appreciate music as “pure musical form,” as “sounds
combined according to the laws of a mysterious necessity,” implies
that he had in mind an unspeciﬁed formal objective structure to
music which also arouses the “aesthetic emotion.”
“Signiﬁcant form” is therefore a primordial quality and,
although he never says so explicitly, it becomes clear that it is
also a property of the work itself. This leads to some confu-
sion. For, to arouse an emotion, lines, forms, and colors must
be perceived ﬁrst, a function of the perceptive system of the brain.
Hence, interposed between lines, forms, and colors and the emo-
tion that they arouse is perception. I agree with Gould (Gould,
1994) that what Bell calls the aesthetic emotion is better described
as the aesthetic perception; his entire argument acquires much
greater force and coherence, as well as neurobiological relevance,
when viewed in that light. Neurobiology, in turn, is better guided
to ask how visual perception can arouse the aesthetic emotion.
Although Bell does not allude to the deﬁnition of beauty given
by Edmund Burke centuries earlier, there is in that deﬁnition as
well something (perception) that is interposed between the objects
of beauty and the emotion that they arouse: “Beauty is, for the
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 730 | 5
“fnhum-07-00730” — 2013/11/11 — 7:21 — page 6 — #6
Zeki Clive Bell and the neurobiology of aesthetics
greater part, some quality in bodies acting mechanically upon the
human mind by the intervention of the senses” (Burke, 1757; my
italics).
This raises a neurobiological challenge which can be summed
up as follows: are there any arrangements of lines, forms and col-
ors (or indeed of other visual attributes) and the relations between
them which would adhere to neural laws of “mysterious necessity”
and thus satisfy the “unknown and mysterious laws” of our per-
ceptive system sufﬁciently to arouse the aesthetic emotion? More
broadly, do such arrangements result in a pattern of activation in
the perceptive areas that can, by some criterion or another, be said
to correspond to an“aesthetic perception”and what is the relation,
in neural terms, between an aesthetic perception and the“aesthetic
emotion” that it arouses?
OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE
Neurobiologically, the issue revolves around what these “mysteri-
ous laws” can be and how the artist succeeds in tapping them. One
of the weaknesses in Bell’s formulation is, as Gould has so well put
it, the failure to recognize that “the perception of signiﬁcant form
is one thing, the accompanying pleasure another.” And the task
for neurobiology is to try to establish what combinations of lines
and colors, and of other visual attributes, activate the perceptual
areas in a way that they arouse pleasure and, as a correlate, activ-
ity in the mOFC, since it is evident that not all combinations of
lines and colors arouse the aesthetic emotion or lead to activity in
the mOFC. Since Bell’s arena was mainly the visual, it is perhaps
useful to begin by asking whether there is, or there can be, any
common quality in all visual objects that provoke the “aesthetic
emotion.” The question can be more precisely phrased thus: what
is the pattern of activation in visual areas that would recruit activ-
ity in the pleasure and reward centers of the brain, and particularly
the mOFC, which correlates with the aesthetic emotion?
WHY THERE CANNOT BE SINGLE CHARACTERISTIC(S) THAT
AROUSE THE AESTHETIC FEELING
It is common knowledge that many, including Vitruvius, Alberti,
and Leonardo, have sought a characteristic or characteristics of
objects that render them beautiful, but without any ﬁrm con-
clusion. This is partly due to the fact that characteristics such
as proportion and symmetry, though applicable to architecture,
cannot be applied to attributes such as color and it is signiﬁcant
that Bell does not mention them either. It is also partly due to
strong cultural inﬂuences and predilections that often emphasize
different, and contradictory, characteristics with which Bell, inci-
dentally, is speciﬁcally not concerned since his concern is with
the “universal and eternal.” While symmetry and regularity have
been, at one time or another, thought to be important in Western
culture, the Japanese aesthetic places a high premium on asym-
metry and irregularity (fukinsei). And while the unﬁnished and
the unstated are greatly valued in Chinese and Japanese cultures,
as provoking (melancholy) beauty, the unﬁnished has received, at
different times, a very mixed reception inWestern art, as criticisms
of, for example, Cézanne’s work because of its “unﬁnished” status
demonstrate (Zeki, 2008). It is, therefore, idle to suppose that one
can identify a single characteristic or a single set of characteristics
that renders objects as diverse as the list that Bell gives beautiful.
But there is perhaps another, neurobiological, factor why there
is no single characteristic (or characteristics) that turn works of
visual art into something beautiful enough to provoke the “aes-
thetic emotion.” That factor lies in the functional organization of
the visual brain.
Let us for a moment assume that when Bell writes of lines,
forms, and colors, and certain combinations of the three, he lit-
erally means lines, forms, and colors, but ones that are assembled
in certain emotionally (or, better still, perceptually) provocative
ways. In his artistic exploration of form, Mondrian (and others)
supposed that the oriented line, and especially the vertical and
horizontal, is the essential constituents of all forms and that form
can be deﬁned as “the plurality of straight lines in rectangular
opposition” (Mondrian et al., 1986). A neurobiological problem
intrudes here, for the relationship of lines to more complex forms
is enigmatic; ever since the discovery of orientation selective cells
(cells that respond to lines of speciﬁc orientation) in the visual
brain (Hubel and Wiesel, 1959), neurobiologists have supposed
(Riesenhuber and Poggio, 1999, inter alia), though without much
supporting experimental evidence, that such cells are the phys-
iological building blocks of forms in the brain, in hierarchical
fashion, with groups of cells in each visual area analyzing the same
information as temporally antecedent groups of cells in the same
visual area but at a higher level of complexity, or with cells in the
different visual areas that constitute a single hierarchical “form
processing” chain analyzing the same information at a more com-
plex level than the cells in the antecedent area (Hubel and Wiesel,
1977). There is no doubt of the existence of a hierarchical pro-
cessing within visual areas (Alonso and Martinez, 1998; Martinez
and Alonso, 2001). But, even today, it is not at all certain that, if
orientation selective cells are the precursors for the elaboration of
complex forms in the brain, how that elaboration occurs, in other
words how orientation selective cells are used to construct more
complex objects, such as the ones that area lateral occipital cortex
(LOC) responds to (Grill-Spector et al., 2001; see above). Hence
the relationship of line to form is not at all clear. Lines may be
arranged in a pleasing way but when combined to produce more
complex forms, the result may not be so pleasing. Nor is the rela-
tionship of line to form the only enigmatic one in neurobiological
terms; so is the relationship of form to color, the relationship of
moving to stationary stimuli, and of both to color.
It is obvious that any picture, even one combining line and color
alone, as perhaps in the work of Piet Mondrian or Yves Klein, to
mention just two, may have a certain combination and conﬁg-
uration of lines which may activate the areas containing heavy
concentrations of orientation (line) selective cells optimally or
speciﬁcally, and a certain combination of colors that may activate
the cerebral areas specialized for the perception of colors sub-
optimally, or vice versa. In fact, the examples that Bell enumerates
in his list above are much more complex – line and color are only
two amongmany other components. Themasterpieces of Cézanne
and Piero della Francesca are representational and contain faces,
bodies, landscapes, and simulated depth on a ﬂat two dimensional
canvas – features that are known to be processed in separate visual
areas. Here again, one may ﬁnd conﬁgurations that are optimal or
speciﬁc for stimulating one of the specialized visual areas but not
the others.
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“SIGNIFICANT CONFIGURATION” IN DIFFERENT VISUAL
DOMAINS
In terms of modern neurobiology, then, another weakness of Bell’s
theory is that, even when writing of the visual domain alone, his
signiﬁcant form is constituted by, and restricted to, lines, forms,
and colors and their arrangement in relation to one another. For
although there is no disputing their importance, these attributes
are not only processed by separate neural systems in the brain
(Zeki, 1978a,b; DeYoe and Van Essen, 1985; Shipp and Zeki, 1985;
Livingstone and Hubel, 1988; Zeki et al., 1991) but also are not the
only attributes which can arouse an “aesthetic emotion.” A much
more complex picture of the visual brain, and how it functions,
has emerged over the past 50 years (see Figure 3). The primary
visual cortex, or visual area V1, is the principal but not sole corti-
cal recipient of visual signals from the retina. Surrounding it are
several visual areas which receive specialized visual signals from it
and fromother visual centers, both cortical and sub-cortical. Apart
from one area (V2) which, like V1, appears to have all the primary
visual attributes represented in it (Zeki, 1978a; DeYoe and Van
Essen, 1985; Shipp and Zeki, 1985; Livingstone and Hubel, 1988)
the other areas surrounding V1–V2 are specialized to process dif-
ferent attributes of the visual world. Among these specializations
are ones for visual motion (based on area V5 and its satellites
– the V5 complex; Zeki, 1974; Watson et al., 1993; Orban et al.,
1995), the V4 complex, critical for the perception of colors (Zeki,
1973; McKeefry and Zeki, 1997; Bartels and Zeki, 2000; Wade
et al., 2002; Goddard et al., 2011) and form-in-association with
color (Zeki, 1993); and the V3 complex (comprising V3,V3A, and
V3B; Smith et al., 1998; Press et al., 2001), specialized for the per-
ception of forms, especially dynamic ones (Zeki et al., 1991, 2003;
Zeki, 1993). Other areas are specialized for the perception of faces
(Sergent et al., 1992; Kanwisher et al., 1997) and facial expressions
(Yang et al., 2002; Vuilleumier and Pourtois, 2007; Derntl et al.,
2009) as well as human bodies (Downing et al., 2001), although
there is some disagreement about whether faces are processed by
separate areas or by separate groupings within a larger area that
also processes objects (Haxby et al., 2001). Evidence suggests that
there are other cerebral visual areas which are specialized for other
attributes. One of these is the LOC (Malach et al., 1995), located
more anteriorly in the visual brain, and critically involved in object
recognition, although how its properties are elaborated from the
orientation selective cells of V1 and V2, a common if unproven
supposition (see above), remains unknown. The total number
of visual areas in the brain has not yet been determined, and
more areas continue to be discovered; previously established areas
are sometimes subdivided into further areas. But the multiplic-
ity of visual areas in the brain is now established beyond doubt
(Figure 3).
The functions that I have attributed to these areas are not nec-
essarily their only functions. It is certain that there are common
functions that they all share. Among these is attention, and all areas
so far studied have been found to have attentional mechanisms
built into them (Boynton, 2009; Jehee et al., 2011). It is probable
that each area has additional functions. What is reasonably well
established is that damage to the brain, when restricted to one of
these areas, results in an imperception for the attribute for which
that area is specialized. Damage to theV4 complex leads to the syn-
drome of cerebral achromatopsia (Meadows, 1974a; Mollon et al.,
1980; Zeki, 1990) when the world is no longer perceived in color
but in “dirty” shades of gray; damage to the V5 complex results
in the syndrome of cerebral akinetopsia (Zeki, 1991), leading to
an incapacity to see objects in the visual world when they are in
motion; damage to the area specialized for face perception leads to
the syndrome of prosopagnosia, an incapacity to recognize people
FIGURE 3 | Schematic surface drawings of the brain to indicate (A) the relative positions of the early visual areas (V1–V5) referred to in the text and
(B) the positions of areas critical for face (OFA and FFA), body (EBA) and object (LOC) representation. For further details, see text.
Frontiers in Human Neuroscience www.frontiersin.org November 2013 | Volume 7 | Article 730 | 7
“fnhum-07-00730” — 2013/11/11 — 7:21 — page 8 — #8
Zeki Clive Bell and the neurobiology of aesthetics
by their faces (Pallis, 1955; Meadows, 1974b; Steeves et al., 2006).
In fact, even the form system of the visual brain, widely regarded
as a single hierarchical system (Felleman andVan Essen, 1991) that
elaborates complex forms from more simple ones, and especially
from cells that respond to lines of speciﬁc orientation, may in
fact be composed of several parallel systems. The evidence for this
comes from two sources – brain imaging experiments and clinical
observations. The former shows that increasingly more complex
forms constituted from lines (lines, angles, and rhomboids) do
not activate visual areas with heavy concentrations of orientation
selective cells more strongly than the simple lines from which they
are constituted, as would be expected if complex forms are built up
serially from simpler ones; instead all three forms activate all such
areas with equal strength. Moreover, the latency of activation of
these areas with lines and rhomboids is also much the same (Shigi-
hara and Zeki, 2013), rather than what might be expected from
the hierarchical doctrine of form construction, that more com-
plex forms should activate the visual areas with longer latencies
than simpler forms. This suggests that the perceptual hierarchy of
forms is not mirrored by a spatial or temporal hierarchy of form
processing in the brain. In Gestalt language, “the whole is other
than the sum of the parts.”
The clinical evidence shows that an agnosia for complex shapes
and objects need not be accompanied by an agnosia for simple
line representation of the same shapes (Humphreys and Rid-
doch, 1987) and, conversely, that agnosia for simple line drawings
of complex shapes need not be accompanied by an agnosia for
the complex shapes themselves (Hiraoka et al., 2009). These are
some of the best documented examples of speciﬁc visual syn-
dromes resulting from damage to speciﬁc, specialized, visual areas,
although there are other ones. Collectively, this evidence supple-
ments the anatomical and physiological evidence in favor of a
functional specialization in the visual brain.
Hence, Bell’s formulation, though restricted to lines and
colors, forces us to go beyond and, in light of modern neuro-
biology, leads us to the broader question of whether there is
a signiﬁcant conﬁguration for other visual attributes, such as
faces, bodies and objects – attributes that are processed in dis-
tinct visual areas – that arouse the aesthetic emotion and, if
there are, where in the brain these conﬁgurations are detected,
through what neural means, and what the relationship is between
the hypothetical neural activity in these specialized areas and
activity in the mOFC which is a correlate of the experience of
beauty.
SEPARATE NEURAL SYSTEMS FOR GROUPING VISUAL
SIGNALS ACCORDING TO ATTRIBUTE
Bell wrote of the “combination” of lines and colors and it is inter-
esting to note that grouping of stimuli (which is only loosely
equivalent to the combinationof lines andof colors thatBell speaks
of) is also processed separately in the brain. Grouping (or seg-
mentation) is a critical process in visual recognition (Wertheimer
et al., 1950/1923; Palmer, 2002). Anatomical and imaging experi-
ments show that the processes underlying grouping for different
attributes are separated within the parietal cortex. One part of the
parietal cortex seems to be involved in grouping of stimuli accord-
ing to color and a separate, more lateral though adjacent, part
FIGURE 4 | Among the brain areas where the intensity of activity is
proportional to the preferred pattern of kinetic stimuli are areasV5,
seen here in a horizontal brain section (A) and the parietal cortex,
shown in a sagittal section (B).The activity in V5 that correlated with the
preferred ratings of these kinetic patterns also correlated with activity in the
mOFC (B). From Zeki and Stutters (2012).
involved when they are grouped according to direction of motion
(Zeki and Stutters, 2013), reﬂecting the anatomical arrangement
of connections from V4 (color) and V5 (motion) to the parietal
cortex, the input from V4 lying medially to that from V5 within
parietal cortex (Shipp andZeki, 1995; Figure 4). It seems likely that
a separate but contiguous part of the parietal cortex is involved
in grouping of visual signals according to form (Braddick et al.,
2000). Moreover, these same but separate regions of parietal cor-
tex appear to be involved in forming visual concepts based on color
and motion (Cheadle and Zeki, 2013, submitted). Bell’s formula-
tion thus raises the interesting, and so far un-addressed, issue of
whether there is a quantitative relationship between the intensity
of activity in these parietal cortex sub-divisions and aesthetically
satisfying groupings of color, motion, and other visual attributes
that are separately processed and whether there is any relationship
between the activity produced by aesthetic groupings and activity
in the mOFC.
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THE PROJECTION OF FUNCTIONAL SPECIALIZATION IN TIME
A specialization for processing different visual attributes can also
be surmised from psychophysical evidence, which shows that we
become conscious of the color of a visual stimulus before we
become conscious of its orientation or of its direction of motion
(Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997;Viviani andAymoz, 2001; Arnold and
Clifford, 2002; Linares and Lopez-Moliner, 2006). The temporal
difference is not insigniﬁcant – color is perceived before motion
by about 80 ms, an inordinately long time in neural terms. Hence
the observed functional specialization is projected in time, and
leads to a perceptual asynchrony in vision. The consequences of
this asynchrony are important for understanding how the visual
brain functions and may also have some relevance in the con-
text of Bell’s formulations. Since attributes such as color, form
and motion are processed by distinct and geographically sepa-
rate areas of the visual brain, it follows that visual consciousness
is distributed in space. Since we become conscious of different
attributes at different times, it follows that visual consciousness
is also distributed in time. From which it follows that there
are several visual consciousnesses which are distributed in time
and space (Zeki, 2003). Hence, in temporal terms, these differ-
ent attributes of vision are also handled separately in the visual
brain, raising neurobiological questions in terms of Bell’s formu-
lation. Is a grouping according to color also made faster than a
grouping according to, say, motion and, if so, would an aesthet-
ically satisfying grouping according to color be perceived before
an aesthetically satisfying grouping according to motion or some
other attribute? It is plausible, and interesting, to suppose that
combinations that satisfy some more primitive signiﬁcant conﬁg-
uration, and are found to be more aesthetically pleasing, may be
processed more rapidly than those which, not coming as close to
satisfying a signiﬁcant conﬁguration, are found to be less satisfying
aesthetically.
But Bell of course goes beyond lines and colors, to their com-
bination. How lines and colors are combined in the brain to give
us our “unitary” experience of a composition, and thus arouse
the “aesthetic emotion,” remains a mystery. Indeed, it is not even
clear that they are combined or that our experience is unitary.
Nor is it clear how other attributes are combined to give us our
unitary experience. In a composite picture, it is almost impossi-
ble to concentrate on the color and the shape simultaneously and
psychophysical evidence (see above) that, over brief windows of
time, separate attributes are processed and perceived separately
and are thus misbound (Moutoussis and Zeki, 1997), suggests that
they may not be combined, at least over such brief windows of
time. Yet there is no denying that the combination of the two, as
well as of other attributes, can be critical to the aesthetic value
of a painting nor is there any denying that lines and colors, as
well as other attributes, are combined over the longer term. It is
a puzzle that neurobiology has not yet solved, but one possibil-
ity that must be entertained is that such binding does not occur
by physiological interaction between separate perceptual areas but
is post-perceptual and may involve memory. This is interesting
from another point of view. The aesthetic emotion that an object
arouses does so when viewed holistically, but it is not at all certain
that its different components are all perceived at the same time.
A portrait painting may have an aesthetically appealing face and a
colored background; while there is little doubt that the face itself
will be perceived holistically (see below), it is likely (given the evi-
dence above) that the colors of the background will be perceived
on a different time-scale, thus raising the question of how all the
elements are ultimately bound together, emphasizing once again
that the whole is other than the sum of the parts.
SIGNIFICANT CONFIGURATION AS A BETTER TERM
If we follow Gould in replacing“aesthetic emotion”with“aesthetic
perception,” we might do well to ask speculatively whether the
mysterious laws that Bell speaks of consist of preferred activation
patterns in the relevant visual areas, the result of certain combina-
tions of the relevant attribute which are biologically determined to
be more signiﬁcant and hence independent of culture and learn-
ing. The mysterious laws that the artist taps becomes, then, his or
her capacity to create forms that activate the relevant visual areas
either optimally or speciﬁcally, by which I mean activate them in
a way that is different from that obtained by stimuli that lack the
signiﬁcant conﬁguration. Perhaps only when so activated are the
“sensory” areas of the brain able to arouse the aesthetic emotion.
These hypothetical conjectures may not in fact be so improbable,
as I discuss below. Here, I would like to propose that the term
“signiﬁcant conﬁguration” may be better tailored to what we know
about the visual brain than Bell’s “signiﬁcant form,” since the lat-
ter, by his deﬁnition, is restricted to lines and colors and their
combinations. The term signiﬁcant conﬁguration is not so lim-
ited; it could apply to any attribute – for example, faces, bodies,
or kinetic stimuli. All one has to do is to determine whether there
is a signiﬁcant conﬁguration in each of these different domains
that activates the area maximally, or optimally, or in a way that
might be referred to as aesthetically. When considering aesthetic
perception, however, we have to consider both positive and nega-
tive effects since, to experience something as beautiful, implies not
experiencing it as ugly or neutral, and vice versa. Overall, expe-
riencing something as beautiful leads, inter alia, to activation of
the mOFC while experiencing something as ugly or threatening
leads to activation of other structures, principally the amygdala
(Morris et al., 1996) and insula (Krolak-Salmon et al., 2003). But
objects, and in particular faces and bodies, are perceived holisti-
cally (Tanaka and Farah, 1993; Aviezer et al., 2012) and hence it is
a signiﬁcant conﬁguration of the various constituents, the “com-
binations” that Bell speaks of, that qualiﬁes a face as happy or ugly,
a body as joyful or threatening, and a kinetic stimulus as pleasing
or neutral.
A SIGNIFICANT CONFIGURATION FOR THE VISUAL MOTION
SYSTEM
It is perhaps instructive to begin by looking at the simplest of
stimuli, that of visual motion, and asking whether there is a signif-
icant conﬁguration in a pattern of kinetic stimuli that is preferred
by subjects and that privileges it over other kinetic patterns. By
privileging it, I mean (a) that it leads to a different pattern of
activation than other kinetic stimuli and (b) that it leads to a cor-
related activity in the mOFC. A different pattern of activation can
be one of three possibilities: (a) a more intense response from the
visual areas specialized in the processing of visual motion; (b) a
speciﬁc pattern of activation that engages a different group of cells
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than the ones engaged by other patterns (a and b are not mutually
exclusive); (c) an optimal response, which is not the same as a
more intense response.
Area V5, one of the most intensively studied areas of the brain,
is specialized for visual motion; its cells respond to motion, most
of them being directionally selective (Zeki, 1974; Van Essen et al.,
1981; McKeefry et al., 1997; Bair and Movshon, 2004; i.e., respon-
sive to one direction of motion and not to motion in the opposite
direction). Other areas in the brain that respond robustly to
motion are those that constitute the V3 complex (V3, V3A/V3B),
which may be involved in the perception of dynamic forms (Zeki,
1993; Zeki et al., 2003). Collectively, these areas provide fertile
ground for testing the supposition that subjective preference for
a given category of visual stimuli – in this case kinetic stimuli
– results in a different pattern of activation than non-preferred
kinetic stimuli (Zeki and Stutters, 2012).
Recent experiments demonstrate that there are certain combi-
nations of dots in motion (kinetic stimuli) that are preferred by
humans over other combinations, and that the preferred combina-
tions activate the areas specialized for visual motion, among them
the V5 complex, as well as other areas which may be involved in
the perception of dynamic forms, more powerfully than the non-
preferred combinations (Zeki and Stutters, 2012; Figure 5). The
strength of activity in these areas, as well as in parietal cortex, is
proportional to the intensity of the declared subjective preference
for the patterns of kinetic dots. Hence there is a direct and quan-
tiﬁable relationship between declared preference and strength of
activation in the relevant visual area. Of the threepossibilities given
above, it follows that the observed difference here is a stronger
activity (which can be objectively veriﬁed) with a signiﬁcant con-
ﬁguration of the stimuli (which can also be objectively speciﬁed).
Moreover, viewing the preferred kinetic stimuli also leads to activ-
ity in the mOFC (Zeki and Stutters, 2012). It is as if a signiﬁcant
conﬁguration of kinetic elements activates the relevant visual areas
(V5 andV3A) optimally or selectively (aesthetic perception)which
also correlates with activation of the mOFC (aesthetic emotion).
I emphasize that there are other stimuli – in particular chaotic
motion – which give very strong activation of V5 (ffytche et al.,
1995). Hence when I speak of stronger activation above, I only
mean stronger activation than non-preferred kinetic stimuli. This
raises the possibility that it is not the strongest or maximal activity
that correlates with preference but rather a speciﬁc activity that
becomes optimal when stimuli of the right signiﬁcant conﬁgura-
tion are viewed. How this stronger optimal activation is translated
into an aesthetic appreciation is not certain; aesthetic preference
correlates with activity in other parts of the brain (see below). But
this demonstration nevertheless opens up the possibility that each
of the specialized visual areasmay have a certain, primitive, biolog-
ically derived combination (by which, following Bell, I mean one
that is not subject to cognition, cultural inﬂuences, and learning)
of elements for the attribute that it is specialized in processing,
and that the aesthetic perception (which ultimately leads to the
aesthetic emotion) is aroused when, in a composite picture, each
of the specialized areas is activated preferentially.
The above is perhaps the simplest example of a signiﬁcant con-
ﬁguration that not only leads to stronger or privileged activation
of the early perceptual areas (aesthetic perception) but also has, as
a correlate, activity in themOFC (aesthetic emotion). In fact, other
experiments have shown that there is an increase of activity in the
occipital cortex as a whole, the fusiform gyrus (comprising the
visual areas) and the caudate nucleus when subjects view abstract
and representational paintings that they prefer (Vartanian and
Goel, 2004). Hence, it is possible to speculate that “aesthetic per-
ception” (to use Gould’s term) has, as a correlate, an enhanced and
possibly speciﬁc activity within early visual perceptive areas. What
precise neural conditions recruit activity in the mOFC remains to
be seen. The determination of these conditions may link aesthetic
perception to aesthetic emotion.
SIGNIFICANT CONFIGURATIONS FOR FACES AND BODIES
Outside motion, it is clear that there are essential conﬁgurations
(to be distinguished from signiﬁcant conﬁgurations) which are
critical for activating the relevant visual areas or systems. Among
the most obvious are faces and bodies. There is no doubt that
there is an essential conﬁguration that qualiﬁes a set of stimuli as
constituting a face. New-born infants apparently have an innate
predisposition for recognizing faces even a few hours after birth
(Goren et al., 1975; Johnson et al., 1991). The underlying mech-
anism has been debated, some suggesting that we are born with
an inherited template that privileges face recognition, others that
there is an inborn preference for stimuli that, when ﬁxated, have
more elements in the upper ﬁelds (two eyes) than in the lower (one
mouth; Simion et al., 2002) or that a rapid plasticity that, through
intimate contact with the mother, privileges recognition of faces.
Whichever explanation turns out to be correct,most would readily
accept that the recognition of faces is privileged over the recogni-
tion of other objects, especially man-made artifacts such as houses
or cars. The general consensus is that face perception is holistic or
conﬁgural (Rossion et al., 2011) and that distortions of that essen-
tial conﬁguration, even a mere inversion, for both faces and bodies
(Gliga andDehaene-Lambertz, 2005) lead to signiﬁcant difﬁculties
in identifying them and to marked differences in cortical activity
(Haxby et al., 2000). Other evidence also points to the robustness
of the neural representation for faces. Violations of the basic essen-
tial conﬁguration that constitutes a face or body (something that
the artist Francis Bacon specialized in) are not readily adapted
to, unlike violations of the conﬁguration of man-made objects
(Chen and Zeki, 2011). It is evident, then, that there is a signiﬁ-
cant conﬁguration, departure from which can never qualify a face
as beautiful or lead to an aesthetic emotion. Hence it is the way
that elements are combined that gives the essential conﬁguration
that is critical for recognition of a stimulus as a face (rather than
an individual face, which depends upon experience). Only a few
outlines are sufﬁcient to qualify a stimulus as being that of a face
or a body, as artists from the Ice Age onward and especially artists
of the Cycladic civilization recognized. The same is broadly true
for bodies, although it appears that the ability to recognize bod-
ies develops somewhat later than for faces (Heron-Delaney et al.,
2011). It is worth emphasizing that the areas of the brain that are
critical for face recognition can be activated with faces alone, in
other words that the faces need not be parts of bodies; equally, the
areas of the brain that are critical for the perception of bodies can
be activated by headless bodies (Downing et al., 2001). This per-
haps emphasizes that a signiﬁcant conﬁguration that applies to a
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FIGURE 5 | Overlaid contrasts showing conjunction of activity produced by the contrasts color grouping > no grouping (yellow) and motion
grouping > no grouping (cyan) as seen in coronal (A), parasagittal (B) and horizontal (C) sections through the brain. From Zeki and Stutters (2013).
body does so independently of the face and vice versa, highlighting
again the separate treatment of these two entities, although it is
also worth emphasizing that the areas of the brain critical for face
perception are intimately connected with those critical for body
perception (de Gelder, 2006).
Beyond the recognition of a face as a face or a body as a body,
there are signiﬁcant conﬁgurations that give it an emotional enve-
lope to qualify it as beautiful or not. It is common knowledge
that we are able to classify a face or body from another race or
culture as beautiful (Cunningham et al., 1995; Rhodes, 2006) and
various characteristics, including youth, symmetry, averageness,
and lighter skin colors as well as a combination of large eyes, small
noses, and full lips (Jones et al., 1995) have been put forward as
playing universal roles in facial attractiveness (for women; Coet-
zee et al., 2012) although the golden ratio apparently does not
(Kiekens et al., 2008; Rossetti et al., 2013). Faces and bodies can
thus be said to have a signiﬁcant conﬁguration, outside of which
neither can be qualiﬁed as beautiful, which is not the same thing
as saying that adherence to that conﬁguration would necessarily
qualify a face or a body as beautiful; there clearly are other factors
that, in addition to the signiﬁcant conﬁguration for face or body,
arouse the aesthetic emotion. It has been suggested, for example,
that rounded body displays and movements are perceived as being
warm and friendly (Aronoff et al., 1992); in more general terms, it
is common knowledge that certain conﬁgurations of the face, the
mouth, the eyes, and eyebrows may signal sadness or happiness.
Hence the “mysterious laws” that the artist taps are creations that
approximate as much as possible to these conﬁgurations to arouse
the “aesthetic emotion.”
Thus departure from an essential conﬁguration – through
inversion or other means – markedly affects the pattern of activity
in the brain for faces and bodies while approximation to a sig-
niﬁcant conﬁguration and therefore to a privileged activation of
the sensory areas results in aesthetically more satisfying displays –
either of kinetic patterns or of faces (Ishai, 2007) and bodies or of
abstract and representational paintings. Once the requirements for
a signiﬁcant conﬁguration are satisﬁed, there are almost certainly
other signiﬁcant conﬁgurations, yet to be discovered, which are
critical in qualifying a face as attractive or aesthetic, thus leading
(possibly) to an aesthetic emotion. Nor are essential and signif-
icant conﬁgurations necessarily limited to the attributes I have
described above. They may extend into spatial relationships which
are also robust, in the sense that impossible relationships appear
to be difﬁcult to adapt to neurally, just as violations of the essential
conﬁgurations of a face are difﬁcult to adapt to neurally (Chen and
Zeki, 2011).
One supposes that stimuli with signiﬁcant conﬁgurations are
also ones that are more potent in recruiting attentional mech-
anisms and therefore attracting attention than stimuli that lack
them and are therefore more neutral. Theoretically, it should be
possible to compare the extent to which stimuli that are experi-
enced as beautiful are more potent in mobilizing the attentional
system compared to counterparts that are not. Since signiﬁcant
conﬁgurations are, in Bell’s formulation and mine, independent of
culture and learning one would expect that the attentional mech-
anisms would be activated through a bottom-up system. It is of
course plausible that the mechanism could be more circuitous and
involve feed-back from emotional centers such as the mOFC, an
issue that can be addressed experimentally.
CONCLUSION
The critical points, then, that Bell’s essay brings into experimental
focus may be summarized as follows:
(1) By focusing on the “aesthetic emotion” and implying that all
works of art are capable of arousing it, his formulation focuses
neurobiological attention on what one may loosely call a com-
monpath. Implied in this is that there is something common in
the emotions aroused by different works that are experienced
as aesthetically beautiful, something that ﬁnds a correlate in
the common activitywithin themOFC,a part of the emotional
brain whose activity correlates with the experience of beauty.
It raises the interesting question of whether, once provoked,
the aesthetic emotion can be further differentiated into, for
example, visual or musical even if its source and the pathways
that lead to the mOFC from the different sensory areas can be
so differentiated.
(2) By focusingon a signiﬁcant form(which I havemodiﬁed to sig-
niﬁcant conﬁguration), his formulation raises the question of
the difference between aesthetic perception and aesthetic emo-
tion. This leads us to address the question of whether there is
some kind of biologically based signiﬁcant conﬁguration that
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activates the relevant sensory areas to arouse the “aesthetic
perception”and whether it is more potent in mobilizing atten-
tional mechanisms in the brain. What would the pattern of
such activation in different domains and for different visual
areas be and how would it differ from activation of the same
areas by equivalent stimuli which do not lead to an aesthetic
percept? Is it maximal activity in the sensory areas, or is it
optimal activity, or is it neither but a kind of speciﬁc activity
in response only to stimuli that have such a conﬁguration? The
evidence from the quite voluminous literature on the neuro-
biology of face perception would seem to favor the principle
of signiﬁcant conﬁguration leading to some kind of privileged
activation, as does the neurobiology of body perception. It is
surprising that this is also true for the neurobiology of motion
perception and, by extension, kinetic art.
(3) Moreover, a privileged activation of an area by a signiﬁcant
conﬁguration is, in Bell’s formulation and mine, independent
of culture and upbringing, so one would expect a pretty uni-
form picture when people from different groupings – whether
ethnic or cultural or educational – are studied as indeed seems
to be the case with the preferred kinetic stimuli described
above. Hence Bell’s formulation focuses attention on what
neural mechanisms or signiﬁcant conﬁgurations are common
to all humans, irrespective of culture and upbringing and how
resistant these conﬁgurations are to exposure to different cul-
tures. In simpler terms, is there anything to suggest that neural
circuits underlying signiﬁcant conﬁgurations are more robust
because more biologically based, and therefore less plastic,
than other conﬁgurations which are modiﬁable by exposure
to different environments?
(4) A“signiﬁcant conﬁguration” is an objectively identiﬁable con-
ﬁguration, with characteristics that can be quantiﬁed, as the
example of the kinetic stimuli given above, or the relations of
the various components of a face to each other that render
it attractive, show. Hence, by relating such objective quali-
ties of a stimulus to an activation that leads to an “aesthetic
perception,” the long-term aim would be to come to a better
understanding of the relationship between objective qualities
and the pattern of brain activation that leads to an aesthetic
perception and triggers an “aesthetic emotion.” This has of
course proved to be difﬁcult even for faces and bodies; it is
likely to prove much more difﬁcult for more complex stimuli,
such as to be found in paintings.
(5) The ﬁltering of signals to one destination or another: an opti-
mal, or maximal, or speciﬁc pattern of activity in an area
implies that stimuli which do not have a signiﬁcant conﬁgu-
ration, and hence do not activate the relevant area in the same
way, would not lead to an aesthetic perception; they would
qualify either as neutral or, if the departure is extreme, as ugly.
This has interesting consequences. When humans view a neu-
tral face there is strong activity in the fusiform face area (FFA)
but when they view a face that they experience as beautiful
there is also a correlated activity in the mOFC. By contrast,
when they view a face that is ugly or disﬁgured, there is, in
addition to the activity in the FFA and other areas critical for
seeing faces, activity in the amygdala. What neural mecha-
nism is it that determines that signals are channeled to one
destination – the mOFC – and not the other? Could it all be
based on the pattern of activity provoked by a signiﬁcant con-
ﬁguration? Or are there other factors besides? This is of course
not a problem linked especially to neuroesthetics; it is a crit-
ical problem for the whole of cortical neurobiology. Every
area of the cerebral cortex has multiple inputs and outputs
and whether all the outputs are activated when an area under-
takes a given task, or whether outputs are selectively activated
depending upon the pattern of activation in that area is a cen-
tral problem in neurobiology. Neuroesthetics may yet provide
fertile ground for addressing this capital issue.
Hence Bell’s aesthetic theory, in somewhat modiﬁed form,
raises issues that are of importance not only for neuroesthetics
and the philosophy of aesthetics but for neurobiology as a whole.
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